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1. INTRODUCTION
It is commonly held that patents are a crucial factor in spurring
development of new technologies, and must be protected even if
doing so prevents access by those who need the technology most.
Yet the preference for protection over access is not universal,
particularly when the product at issue relates to human health. For
example, many scholars believe that intellectual property ("IP")
protection should not be a barrier to distribution of
pharmaceuticals in areas facing a human health crisis. The greatest
conflict between IP protection and human health occurs when a
nation or region faces a severe health emergency but the average
person cannot afford access to essential medicines. The World
Trade Organization's ("WTO") Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS")' tries to mitigate
this tension, offering flexibilities in IP protection when necessary to
safeguard human health.
I Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex IC, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 319, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement).
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However, the TRIPS Agreement merely sets minimum
standards of intellectual property rights, and countries are free to
negotiate and bind themselves to more stringent IP regimes.
Developed countries that export a great deal of intellectual
property-in particular the United States-pursue a policy of
negotiating bilateral free trade agreements ("FTAs") that require IP
protection far in excess of TRIPS-mandated standards, termed
"TRIPS-plus" FTAs. In recent years, the United States has been
negotiating bilateral TRIPS-plus agreements with both Thailand
and the South African Customs Union 2 ("SACU") that would
include significant changes to these countries' current IP systems
and would far surpass the level of protection set out in the TRIPS
Agreement.
Frequently, the stronger intellectual property terms included in
TRIPS-plus FTAs have a significant impact on a nation's access to
life-saving medicines, such as AIDS antiretrovirals, by limiting the
nation's ability to use public health flexibilities under TRIPS. This
is a significant concern in Thailand and the SACU countries
because of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Southeast Asia and sub-
Saharan Africa. These TRIPS-plus agreements warrant close
scrutiny to determine if the consequences of such strong patent
protection in the pharmaceutical field, and the attendant decreases
in flexibility to address human health concerns, are economically
or socially warranted by increases in foreign direct investment or
GDP growth.
After analyzing the terms of the Thailand and SACU FTAs and
some anticipated consequences, this Comment will compare them
to the bilateral FTA that the United States completed with
Australia in 2004. This comparison gives particularly useful
insights because Australia has a prescription drug program that
shares some features in common with the governmental provision
of pharmaceuticals in Thailand and the SACU countries. This
comparison is also useful because the SACU countries and
Thailand both face a significant AIDS problem and lack
pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity, and are likely to
experience more adverse effects than Australia, which can thus
provide a baseline of the negative consequences of these two
proposed FTAs. This comparison should illustrate the potential
economic results for Thailand and SACU and also permit general
2 The South African Customs Union ("SACU") countries are South Africa,
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland.
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recommendations for developing countries with severe HIV/AIDS
problems as they consider FTAs with the United States or other
industrialized countries.
2. THE HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC
2.1. The Nature of the Problem
HIV and AIDS are widely recognized as a growing problem of
paramount importance.3  According to the World Health
Organization ("WHO") and the Joint United Nations Programme
on HIV/AIDS ("UNAIDS"), in 2007, 33.2 million people
worldwide were living with HIV and roughly 2.5 million people
were newly infected.4
The HIV/AIDS problem is the most acute in developing
countries. In 2002, roughly 36 million people in the developing
world had HIV/AIDS.5 The region most severely affected is sub-
Saharan Africa, where in 2007 there were 22.5 million people living
with HIV,6 or 68% of the global total.7 It is not only the total
number of people infected that is alarming -adult HIV prevalence
is also staggeringly high. According to recent population-based
HIV surveys, in 2005-06, Zimbabwe had an adult prevalence rate
of 18.1%.8 In 2004, Botswana had a rate of 25.2% and Lesotho's rate
3 While diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis are also prevalent and
deadly in the developing world, both the extent of the epidemic and the lack of
access to treatment are more pronounced in the case of HIV/AIDS. As such, this
Comment is limited to that disease and its treatment.
4 See JOINT U.N. PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS & WORLD HEALTH ORG., AIDS
EPIDEMIC UPDATE at 1, U.N. Doc. UNAIDS/07.27E/JC1322E (2007), available at
http:/ / data.unaids.org/pub/EPISlides/2007/2007_epiupdate-en.pdf [hereinafter
2007 AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE] (summarizing both global and regional HIV/AIDS
statistics). Estimates of the total number of people worldwide living with HIV fell
from 2006 to 2007 due to advances in the methodologies used to estimate infected
people. Id. at 3. This drop was largely due to a major revision of the totals
estimated for India. Id. Roughly 70% of the changed estimate is due to new data
for India, Angola, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe, none of which is
a SACU nation. Id.
5 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., SCALING UP ANTIRETROVIRAL THERAPY IN
RESOURCE-LIMITED SETTINGS: GUIDELINES FOR A PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACH,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 8 (2002) [hereinafter SCALING UP ANTIRETROVIRAL THERAPY]
(noting growing problems of access to new HIV/ AIDS medications in developing
countries and offering guidelines for improvement).
6 2007 AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE, supra note 4, at 7.
7 Id. at 15.
8 Id. at 11.
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was 23.5%, while a 2006-07 survey in Swaziland showed a
prevalence of 25.9%.9
After sub-Saharan Africa, the second highest number of cases
occurs in Southeast Asia. The WHO estimates that 7.2 million
people in the region were living with HIV/AIDS in 2006.10
Thailand is particularly interesting because it is badly afflicted by
HIV/AIDS, but has instituted successful programs to combat the
disease. As an indication of progress, the number of new HIV
infections in Thailand decreased 10% from 2004 to 2005.11 Despite
this improvement, the country still has 580,000 infected people,
12
and a large number of new infections are occurring in people
considered to have a low risk of infection, such as married
women.13 In addition, HIV prevalence is very high for specific
subgroups in Thailand, ranging from 30% to 50% for injecting drug
users over the past fifteen years.
14
The advance of AIDS shows few signs of slowing, and again
the developing world accounts for the vast majority of new cases.
Sub-Saharan Africa had 1.7 million new HIV infections in 2007
alone,15 while South and Southeast Asia accounted for 860,000 new
cases in 2006.16 In 2006, new HIV infections in these two regions
totaled 3.66 million (roughly 85%) of the 4.3 million new cases
worldwide.17
The severity of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the developing
world is made clear by comparison to North America and Western
and Central Europe, where 2.1 million people were living with
HIV/AIDS in 2006, and 78,000 new people were infected in 2007.18
9 Id.
10 WORLD HEALTH ORG., HIV/AIDS IN THE SOUTH-EAST ASIA REGION 4 (2007),
available at http://www.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/ AIDSSEARO-Report07.pdf.
Note that this report reflects updated numbers for India based on the new
methodologies discussed in note 4.
11 JOINT U.N. PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS & WORLD HEALTH ORG., AIDS
EPIDEMIC UPDATE 32-33 (2006), available at http://www.who.int/hiv/
mediacentre/2006_EpiUpdate..en.pdf [hereinafter 2006 AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE].
12 WORLD HEALTH ORG., EPIDEMIOLOGICAL FACT SHEETS ON HIV/AIDS AND
SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED INFECTIONS: THAILAND 2 (2006), available at http://
www.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/ Facts.andFiguresEFS2006_TH.pdf.
13 2006 AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE, supra note 11, at 33.
14 2007 AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE, supra note 4, at 25.
15 Id. at 15.
16 2006 AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE, supra note 11, at 2.
17 Id.
18 2007 AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE, supra note 4, at 33.
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To put these numbers in context, in 2007 North America had an
adult prevalence of only 0.6% while Western and Central Europe
had an adult prevalence of 0.3%, both below the global rate of 0.8%
and far below the rates in sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia.19
2.2. Antiretroviral Treatment
While antiretroviral drugs ("ARVs") are not a cure, they are an
effective way to treat HIV/AIDS. One physician stated that ARVs
"improve patients' lives and help them to resume their daily
activities. Patients also have a better immune system and have
better resistance to opportunistic diseases." 20 The WHO reports
that ARVs have "dramatically improved rates of mortality and
morbidity, prolonged lives, improved quality of life, revitalised
communities and transformed perceptions of HIV/AIDS from a
plague to a manageable, chronic illness." 21 By some estimates, over
200,000 AIDS deaths each year in South Africa alone are
preventable with ARVs.22 Great need exists for ARVs. In 2005, the
WHO estimated that 4.7 million people in the African region
needed antiretrovirals. 23
Despite the efficacy of and tremendous need for ARV
treatment, many HIV/AIDS-infected people in the developing
world do not have access to these essential medicines. In 2003, of
the roughly five to six million people who urgently needed ARVs
worldwide, only about 400,000 actually had access to them.24
While many factors contribute to unavailability of medicines, in
large part the access gap can be attributed to the cost of treatment.
For example, in South Africa, a three-drug ARV treatment costs
$2000 per person each year at private sector wholesale prices and
19 Id. at 7.
20 OXFAM INT'L, BRIEFING PAPER No. 86, PUBLIC HEALTH AT RISK 6 (2006)
(quoting Dr. Janjira Jirtaknatee).
21 SCALING UP ANTIRETROVIRAL THERAPY, supra note 5, at 8.
22 Sean Flynn, Legal Strategies for Expanding Access to Medicines, 17 EMORY
INT'L L. REV. 535, 540 (2003) (citations omitted).
23 WORLD HEALTH ORG., HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIOLOGICAL SURVEILLANCE REPORT
FOR THE WHO AFRICAN REGION: 2005 UPDATE 1 (2005), available at http://
www.who.int/hiv/pub/epidemiology/hivinafrica2005e-web.pdf.
24 FREDERICK M. ABBOTT & RUDOLPH V. VAN PUYMBROECK, COMPULSORY
LICENSING FOR PUBLIC HEALTH: A GUIDE AND MODEL DOCUMENTS FOR
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DOHA DECLARATION PARAGRAPH 6 DECISION 1 (2005)
(citing UNAIDS, 2004 REPORT ON THE GLOBAL AIDS EPIDEMIC 101 (2004)).
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$750 for the public sector. 25  However, the median yearly
household income in South Africa is only $100026- much too little
to afford ARV treatment using brand name medicines, and in most
cases insufficient to afford the cost in the public sector. As a result
of this and other factors, developing countries, which comprise
75% of the global population, account for less than 10% of the
global pharmaceutical market.27
One solution to the access problem is development of less
expensive, generic forms of patented drugs. The term "generics"
refers both to drugs produced after patent protection has expired
and to drugs whose production during the patent term is
authorized by a licensing agreement. Generics often have the same
or similar efficacy as brand-name drugs at a lower price. The price
differential may be significant, and generics can greatly expand
access. For example, the drug fluconazole, used to treat HIV, costs
$20 per day in Kenya, where it is protected by patent. A generic
version of the same drug costs only 70 cents per day in Thailand.28
3. THE TRIPS AGREEMENT FRAMEWORK
The subject of intellectual property often stirs passionate debate
within the context of the pharmaceutical industry, especially in
regions afflicted with HIV/AIDS. The World Trade Organization's
TRIPS Agreement, enacted in 1994, sets minimum standards of
intellectual property protection required of all WTO member
nations.29 The TRIPS Agreement fundamentally altered global
patent law by conditioning a member nation's right to export
goods to other members upon enforcement of intellectual property
protection. TRIPS expanded protection to several areas where
patents previously were not available. For example, before
enactment of the TRIPS Agreement, most countries' IP systems, in
developing countries and developed nations alike, at some point
25 Flynn, supra note 22, at 540.
26 Id. at 541.
27 See Ellen 't Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential
Medicines: A Long Way From Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 27, 28 (2002)
(discussing the access problem facing developing countries in the pharmaceutical
sector).
28 DONALD G. RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND GLOBAL
CAPITALISM 159 (2004).
29 Exceptions to the TRIPS requirements were made for developing countries,
which were not required to come into TRIPS compliance until 2006. That deadline
was later extended to 2016.
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had refused to grant pharmaceutical patents.30 Under TRIPS,
pharmaceuticals are subject to patent protection in all WTO
nations.31
The TRIPS Agreement has several other patent provisions with
implications in the pharmaceutical context. First, Article 28 allows
pharmaceutical companies to control the location of production,
stating that patent holders have the right to exclude others from
"making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing" its
patented products.32 Article 28 could potentially impede the ability
of developing countries to produce essential medicines locally.
Second, Article 39.3 protects undisclosed test data or other
information related to pharmaceuticals from unfair commercial use
and disclosure. 33 This provision may be interpreted to extend
protection of pharmaceutical products- even beyond their twenty-
year patent term -by protecting the data that led to their creation.
3.1. Flexibilities Under TRIPS
The TRIPS Agreement's minimum standards significantly
reduced developing countries' options for getting access to
30 Simon Walker, The TRIPS Agreement, Sustainable Development and the Public
Interest 23 (IUCN Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 41, 2001), available at
http://www.ecolomics-intemational.org/iprsan.simon-walker-iucn-trips.pdf.
31 See TRIPS Agreement art. 27.1 (stating that "patents shall be available for
any inventions" and that patents shall be "enjoyable without discrimination as
to... the field of technology").
32 TRIPS Agreement art. 28.1(a). Article 28 has led to some movement of
pharmaceutical production out of developing countries. See Brook K. Baker,
Analysis and Response to VVTO Action Regarding Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 10 n.18 (United Nations Millennium
Development Goals Project Task Force 5, Dec. 10, 2003) (noting that Chile and
South Africa lost pharmaceutical facilities shortly after the adoption of the TRIPS
Agreement). This is in spite of the goal of technology transfer to developing
countries, stated in Article 7. See TRIPS Agreement art. 7 ("The protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of
technology .... ").
33 Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement states:
Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing
of pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products which utilize new
chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed test or other data, the
origination of which involves a considerable effort, shall protect such
data against unfair commercial use. In addition, Members shall protect
such data against disclosure, except where necessary to protect the
public, or unless steps are taken to ensure that the data are protected
against unfair commercial use.
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essential medicines. However, the agreement retains an emphasis,
at least in principle, on promoting human health. Article 8 states
that members may implement measures needed to protect public
health as long as those measures are consistent with the other
provisions of TRIPS.34 Despite strong IP protection, several key
areas of flexibility remain in TRIPS that should help these countries
protect public health. These include compulsory licensing, parallel
importation, provisions defining the scope of patentable subject
matter, the early working exception and provisions regarding the
extent of test data protection, and measures to control abuse of
patent rights and anticompetitive practices. 35 The main features of
these flexibilities are addressed here.
3.1.1. Compulsory Licensing
Many countries, including developed nations, offer some form
of compulsory license under their patent system.36 These licenses
are created without the permission of the patent holder, and are
generally made available to address problems or inequities in the
patent system, such as anticompetitive practices or public health
emergencies. 37 While actual use of compulsory licensing has been
rare, the threat of this measure occasionally has been effective in
addressing public health emergencies. For example, both the
United States and Canadian governments used the threat of
34 See TRIPS Agreement art. 8.1 ("Members may... adopt measures
necessary to protect public health.., provided that such measures are consistent
with the provisions of this Agreement.").
35 See, e.g., SISULE F. MUSUNGU ET AL., SOUTH CENTRE, UTILIZING TRIPS
FLEXIBILITIES FOR PUBLIC HEALTH PROTECTION THROUGH SOUTH-SOUTH REGIONAL
FRAMEWORKS 12-23 (2004), available at http://www.southcentre.org/publications/
flexibilities/flexibilities.pdf.
36 See CARLOS CORREA, SOUTH CENTRE, INTEGRATING PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERNS
INTO PATENT LEGISLATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 93 (2000), available at
http://www.southcentre.org/publications/publichealth/publichealth.pdf
(citation omitted) [hereinafter CORREA, INTEGRATING PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERNS]
(defining "compulsory licenses" and discussing the grounds for granting a
compulsory license); MUSUNGU ET AL., supra note 35, at 13 (listing situations where
compulsory licenses are an appropriate tool). See generally Carlos M. Correa,
Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory Licenses: Options for Developing
Countries (South Centre, Trade-Related Agenda, Development and Equity,
Working Paper 5, Oct. 1999), available at http://www.southcentre.org/
publications/workingpapers/wp05.pdf (discussing conditions that may give rise
to authorization for compulsory licenses, including, inter alia, refusal to deal, non-
working and inadequate supply, public interest, and anticompetitive practices).
37 CORREA, INTEGRATING PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERNS, supra note 36, at 94.
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compulsory licenses to spur Bayer, the holder of the patent on the
antibiotic drug ciprofloxacin ("Cipro"), to make sufficient
quantities to respond to the anthrax scare that followed the
September 11, 2001 attacks.
38
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement permits member nations to
issue compulsory licenses of patented products, and while it does
not technically restrict the grounds on which members may grant
licenses, it does set out conditions that member states should
meet.39 For example, members should only grant compulsory
licenses on a case-by-case basis.40 Compulsory licenses are only
permitted where a member has tried to get a license from the
patent holder on "reasonable terms and conditions," but these
efforts have been unsuccessful. 4' However, this prior request
condition may be waived in the case of a "national emergency" or
other extremely urgent situation, if use is non-commercial.
42
Importantly, the term of use under the compulsory license is
limited to "the purpose for which it was authorized" under Article
31(C).43 Further, authorization under the compulsory license can be
terminated when the circumstances that justified the use cease to
exist.44
Another important condition is that the compulsory license
must be used "predominantly for the supply of the domestic
market.... ."45 This requires that at least 50% of the product that is
manufactured be used domestically. This condition has serious
implications for countries that do not have pharmaceutical
manufacturing capacity because they may not be able to meet this
requirement, and TRIPS limits other nations' ability to export
medicines to the country in need under the terms of a compulsory
license.
Finally, the patent holder has the right to compensation for the
38 See Baker, supra note 32, at 13 (discussing U.S. and Canadian threats of a
compulsory license for ciprofloxacin).
39 TRIPS Agreement art. 31 (discussing the requirements for issuing a
compulsory license).
40 See id. art. 31(a) ("[A]uthorization of such use shall be considered on its
individual merits.")
41 Id. art. 31(b).
42 Id.
43 Id. art. 31(c).
44 Id. art. 31(g).
45 Id. art. 31(f).
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use based on the economic value of the license.46 Interestingly, the
remuneration requirement applies even when a product is
exported to a country where it is not protected by a patent. In
these circumstances, the importing country is worse off under
TRIPS than if it fostered domestic production of products that were
patented abroad, but not subject to patent protection
domestically. 47
3.1.2. Parallel Importation
The second key flexibility in TRIPS is parallel importation,
which is closely coupled with compulsory licensing. This term
refers to a practice in which a third party imports a product
marketed in a foreign country by the patent holder, in competition
with the product that same patent holder imports or manufactures
locally.48 This practice is used to prevent price discrimination
between markets in cases where a product is available at a much
lower price in one country than in another.49 Supporters of parallel
importation point out that patent holders still receive
compensation in the country in which the product is first sold.
Parallel imports are allowed under TRIPS Article 8.1 .5o
3.1.3. Research and Early Working Exceptions, Test Data
Limitations
An effective way to speed introduction of less expensive
generic medicines is to allow development prior to expiration of
the patented drug's protection. The research and experimental use
exception allows manufacturers of generics to experiment with
patented drugs during the patent term to try to "invent around"
the patent.51 This can lead to new products that serve the same
46 Id. art. 31(h).
47 See Baker, supra note 32, at 26 ("[T]he importing, no-patent Member will be
required to pay the added cost of a license royalty even though there would have
been no royalty on locally produced medicines.").
48 See MUSUNGU ET AL., supra note 35, at 13 (discussing parallel importation
under the TRIPS Agreement).
49 Id. at 14.
50 See TRIPS Agreement art. 8.1 ("Members may... adopt measures
necessary to protect public health and nutrition .. "). For a more thorough
discussion of the benefits, drawbacks, and legal basis for parallel importation, see
CORREA, INTEGRATING PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERNS, supra note 36, at 71-80.
51 See MUSUNGU ET AL., supra note 35, at 17 ("The exception is useful in
fostering pharmaceutical technological progress by exempting experimentation
2008] 773
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purposes as the patented invention, or to improvements on the
existing patent.52 This exception falls under TRIPS Article 30,53 and
also exists in the United States although its scope is somewhat
narrow.54
The early working exception allows makers of generics to use a
patented drug without permission from the patent holder in order
to produce and then obtain regulatory approval and registration of
a generic before the patent drug's term of protection expires.
55
However, the generic is not released in the market before expiry of
the patent term. Instead, the exception helps ensure that generics
are available without significant delay following expiration of the
patent term.56 In the United States, this exception is codified in the
1984 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act,
57
also called the Hatch-Waxman Act. It is also called the "Bolar"
exception.58
Finally, flexibility regarding protection of test data stems from
acts for purposes such as inventing around the initial invention, improving on the
invention or for the purposes of evaluating the invention and determining if it
works.").
52 CORREA, INTEGRATING PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERNS, supra note 36, at 66 ("An
experimental use exception may foster technological progress based on 'inventing
around' or improving a protected invention, as well as permit evaluation of an
invention .... ").
53 See TRIPS Agreement art. 30 ("Members may provide limited exceptions to
the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent ... ").
Experimental use is allowed under TRIPS Article 30, but because in practice it
may lead to creation of products that are very similar to patented ones, it may
give rise to infringement under the doctrine of equivalents in some countries. See
CORREA, INTEGRATING PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERNS, supra note 36, at 66, 87-91
(discussing patent infringement through equivalence).
54 See CORREA, INTEGRATING PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERNS, supra note 36, at 66
(citing HAROLD WEGNER, PATENT LAW IN BIOTECHNOLOGY, CHEMICALS AND
PHARMACEUTICALS 267 (1994)).
55 See MUSUNGU ET AL., supra note 35, at 17-18 (explaining that the purpose of
the early working exception was to ensure that generic versions would be
available on the market within a reasonable time of the patent expiration).
56 Id.
57 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28,
and 35 U.S.C.).
58 The "Bolar" exception is named for the case Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar
Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that that the competitor's
use of a patented ingredient to perform tests necessary for FDA approval for its
own product was infringement because it did not fall within the experimental use
exception).
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interpretation of TRIPS Article 39.3, which states that when a
member nation mandates submission of undisclosed test data as a
condition of market approval for new pharmaceuticals or other
new chemicals, the member nation must protect against unfair
commercial use of this data.59 However, the text also says that
member nations shall protect against disclosure of this data except
where it is necessary to protect the public.60 Some scholars argue
that requiring generic drug manufacturers to conduct the same
tests as the holder of a drug patent, at considerable expense,
increases generic prices and decreases the social utility of
generics.61
3.2. Benefits of TRIPS Flexibilities and Generics
The provisions in TRIPS designed to protect public health, such
as compulsory licenses, can have a significant impact. For
example, in Brazil between 1996 and 2000, AIDS drugs with no
generic substitutes saw only a 9% price drop.62 However, Brazil
instituted its own Industrial Property Law ("IPL") in 1997, which
made patent protection contingent on production of the patented
items in Brazil (termed "local working") and also provided for
compulsory licenses of products not produced locally if they are
sufficiently important. 63 As a result, the price of drugs with
generic substitutes fell 79% from 1996 to 2000.64 Thailand has also
pursued a successful strategy for treating its HIV/AIDS problem
based on the use of generic drugs, discussed further in Section 6.1,
infra.
59 TRIPS Agreement art. 39.3.
60 See id. ("Members shall protect such data against disclosure, except where
necessary to protect the public .... ").
61 See Frederick M. Abbott, The TRIPS Agreement, Access to Medicines and the
WTO Doha Ministerial Conference 29 (United Nations Quaker Office, Occasional
Paper No. 7, 2001) [hereinafter Abbott, Access to Medicines] ("Requiring generic
producers to conduct identical trials on equivalent compounds is socially wasteful
and imposes additional costs on the public.").
62 RICHARDS, supra note 28, at 159.
63 Id. at 157.
64 Id. at 159.
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4. RESPONSES TO TRIPS
4.1. U.S. Action
Despite the strong protection for intellectual property rights
given by TRIPS, developed countries, notably the United States
and the European Union, have sought even stronger patent
protection. This was a response, in part, to use by developing
nations of the flexibilities within TRIPS to promote public health.
For example, when the government of Thailand sought to produce
generic forms of patented drugs under the compulsory licensing
provision of TRIPS, the United States threatened trade sanctions
through the U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR").
The United States pursued similar tactics in South Africa. In
1997, the South African government introduced the Medicines Act,
a bill that allowed parallel importation of patented HIV/AIDS
drugs. 65 As a result, the USTR listed South Africa for possible
sanctions if it did not abandon the bill.66 In 1998, a group of
pharmaceutical companies brought suit against the South African
government in the South African courts, alleging that the
Medicines Act discriminated against pharmaceutical producers in
violation of the nation's obligations under TRIPS.67 Only under the
intense pressure of an international lobbying effort against them
did these companies drop their lawsuit. 68
4.2. The Doha Declaration
In April 2001, developing countries responded to the positions
taken by developed countries such as the United States.
Zimbabwe, acting on behalf of the Africa Group, demanded that
65 See PETER DRAHOS, EXPANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY'S EMPIRE: THE ROLE
OF FTAs 16 (2003), available at http://www.grain.org/rightsfiles/drahos-fta-2003
-en.pdf [hereinafter DRAHOS, ROLE OF FTAs] ("[The Medicines Act] specifically
allowed the importation into South Africa of patented medicines which had been
put onto another market with the consent of the patent owner. The idea was to
encourage the importation of patented medicines from the cheapest market
(parallel importation)....").
66 Id.
67 See id. at 16 ("[In February of 1998, 41 pharmaceutical companies began
proceedings in South African courts against the South African government,
naming Nelson Mandela as first defendant.").
68 See id. at 17 ("In April of 2001 the pharmaceutical companies withdrew
from the litigation because of a highly effective global public campaign by civil
society.").
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the TRIPS Council hold a special session to discuss access to
medicines. The United States and European Union took strong
stances in their submissions to the TRIPS Council, advocating
strong patent rights. The United States argued that strong patent
protection promotes research and development on new
pharmaceutical products, encourages foreign direct investment,
and promotes disclosure of technical knowledge. 69 The United
States also argued that least developed WTO member countries
should show evidence that they would be harmed by strong patent
protection before any extension should be granted to the timetable
for compliance with TRIPS.7°
Developing countries also advocated strong positions. They
asserted that patents on pharmaceuticals raise prices and decrease
access; that developing nations should be able to use the
flexibilities within TRIPS without the threat of trade sanctions from
developed countries; that least developed countries ("LDCs")
needed an extension beyond 2006 to come into TRIPS compliance;
that developing countries needed to be able to get generic
medicines from exporting countries; and that the data protection
rules in TRIPS Article 39.3 should not be used to prevent
registration of generics. 71 Developing countries proposed that
TRIPS should include text stating, "[n]othing in the TRIPS
Agreement shall prevent Members from taking measures to protect
public health."72
Despite widely divergent positions, the developed and
developing countries eventually reached agreement on access to
medicines. At the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference, held in
Doha, Qatar, in November 2001, the WTO members adopted the
69 See Abbott, Access to Medicines, supra note 61, at 4 (laying out the United
States' arguments for strong patent protection).
70 Id.
71 See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
TRIPS and Public Health: Submission by the African Group et al., at 3-4, IP/C/W/296
(June 29, 2001) (describing Resolution 200/33 adopted by the 57th Session of the
U.N. Commission on Human Rights, which called upon its members to take
measures to safeguard access to preventative, curative, or palliative
pharmaceuticals); Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Submission
by the African Group et al., IP/C/W/312 (Oct. 4, 2001) [hereinafter Ministerial
Declaration] (recognizing that TRIPS should not limit the research, development,
and availability of medicines and treatments).
72 Ministerial Declaration, supra note 71, at para. 1.
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"Doha Declaration." 73 It explicitly recognized the severity of the
health crises facing developing countries resulting from
HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, and other diseases. 74 Most
importantly, the Declaration stated that the TRIPS Agreement
"does not and should not prevent Members from taking measures
to protect public health."75 As a result, the Declaration stated that
TRIPS "can and should be interpreted and implemented in a
manner supportive of WTO Members' right to protect public
health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all." 76
Also significant in the Doha Declaration was the statement that
"[elach Member has the right to determine what constitutes a
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it
being understood that public health crises, including those relating
to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can
represent a national emergency or other circumstance of extreme
urgency." 7
7
4.3. Compelling Stronger IP Protection Through TRIPS-Plus Free
Trade Agreements
Developed countries have not stopped negotiating for strong
patent protection since the Doha Declaration. It is no surprise that
developed countries, and particularly the United States, favor
strong intellectual property rights. After all, the United States was
the world's leading exporter of intellectual property at the time the
TRIPS Agreement was signed and continues to benefit greatly from
73 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]; World
Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) [hereinafter Declaration on TRIPS &
Public Health].
74 See Declaration on TRIPS & Public Health, supra note 73, at para. 1 ("We
recognize the gravity of the public health problems afflicting many developing
and least-developed countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics.").
75 Id. at para 4.
76 Id. The emphasis on health is consistent with international law. For
example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") states that
"[e]veryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family, including ... medical care and necessary social
services...." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 25,
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter
UDHR].
77 Declaration on TRIPS & Public Health, supra note 73, at para. 5(c).
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intellectual property exports.78 The TRIPS Agreement merely sets
minimum standards of intellectual property protection, and
countries are free to negotiate stronger protection under
multilateral or bilateral FTAs. These agreements are termed
"TRIPS-plus" because they augment the intellectual property
protection available to developed countries existing under TRIPS.
This is not to say that TRIPS provides weak protection for
developed countries. In fact, some scholars have argued that the
TRIPS agreement not only provides protection that is too strong,
but further that it is a coercive treaty of adhesion to which
developing countries only acceded based on explicit or implied
threats of trade sanctions. 79
Despite the strength of patent protection granted to developed
countries under TRIPS, over 130 bilateral and regional free trade
agreements, also called "preferential trade agreements," are in
effect, and most have come into force in the last decade.8 0 In recent
years, the United States has concluded bilateral TRIPS-plus FTAs
with Jordan (2000), Chile (2003), Singapore (2003), Australia (2004),
and Morocco (2004), and negotiated CAFTA, a regional FTA
between the United States and Central America (2004).81 The
United States is also in the process of negotiating FTAs with
Thailand, Bahrain, Andean countries, and the South African
Customs Union.82 A large number of the FTAs that the United
States has negotiated and is currently pursuing are with
developing countries. The same is true of EU countries, which
78 See DRAHOS, ROLE OF FTAs, supra note 65, at 2 ("At the time of the
negotiations the US as the world's principal exporter of intellectual property had
much to gain from the globalization of intellectual property rights via the trade
regime .... ).
79 See Donald P. Harris, Carrying a Good Joke Too Far: TRIPS and Treaties of
Adhesion, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 681, 735 (2006) (citing JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 788
(2002)) ("Developing countries-which 'had serious dread' of the United States'
Section 301 bilateralism - were acutely aware that if they did not sign TRIPS, they
would have to individually 'negotiate' with the United States under threat of
Section 301 actions.").
80 GRAIN, "TRIPS-PLUS" THROUGH THE BACK DOOR: How BILATERAL TREATIES
IMPOSE MUCH STRONGER RULES FOR IPRS ON LIFE THAN THE WTO 8 (2001), available
at http:/ / grain.org/briefingsjfiles/ trips-plus-en.pdf.
81 See OXFAM INT'L, UNDERMINING ACCESS TO MEDICINES: COMPARISON OF FIVE
U.S. FTAS 1 (2004) [hereinafter COMPARISON OF FIVE U.S. FTAS] (listing recent U.S.
FTAs).
82 Id.; Baker, supra note 32, at 61 n.141.
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have recently completed over thirty Bilateral Preferential
Agreements with countries in the Middle East and North Africa.8 3
Some scholars have suggested that the resistance that the
United States and the EU encounter in achieving their trade goals
through multinational negotiations dictates the strength with
which they pursue an agenda of bilateral TRIPS-plus FTAs. 84 As a
result of strong resistance at the TRIPS Council and at Doha-
both multilateral settings-these developed nations have sought
agreements that circumvent TRIPS flexibilities and offer stronger
patent protection than they could achieve in the TRIPS setting.85
This can be seen from several provisions that are common to most
recent U.S. TRIPS-plus FTAs. For example, many extend patent
protection beyond the maximum twenty-year period set out in
both U.S. patent law and TRIPS.8 6  Many also restrict the
permissible grounds for compulsory licensing and give patent
holders the ability to stop parallel importation.87 Finally, these
FTAs limit data access for manufacturers seeking to use a patent
holder's clinical test data to obtain faster approval for generics, and
also prevent registration of generics until after the original drug
patent expires. 88 These provisions of U.S. FTAs specifically address
the TRIPS provisions that allow protection of public health in
developing countries, and that were specifically reaffirmed in the
Doha Declaration.
5. THE CASE AGAINST FTAs IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Developed countries advocate FTAs by highlighting potential
increases in foreign direct investment ("FDI") and technology
transfer, as well as more trade and greater market access.89 In
83 Hamed El-Said & Mohammed El-Said, TRIPS, Bilateralism, Multilateralism
& Implications for Developing Countries: Jordan's Drug Sector, 2 MANCHESTER J. INT'L
ECON. L. 59, 59 (2005).
84 See DRAHOS, ROLE OF FTAs, supra note 65, at 8 ("Where the US or the EU are
at any given moment in the cycle of ratcheting [up IP protection] is determined
essentially by how much effective resistance they are meeting in terms of their
negotiating objectives.").
85 See id. at 9 ("The [U.S.] focus on FTAs at this time can also be explained in
terms of the effective resistance that the US has been encountering at the TRIPS
Council over the last several years.").
86 COMPARISON OF FIvE U.S. FTAS, supra note 81, at 2.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 See, e.g., RAYMOND J. AHEARN & WAYNE M. MORRISON, U.S.-THAILAND FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS 2 (2006), available at http://www.national
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reality, the economic and social advantages are less clear. First, a
great deal of evidence suggests more meager benefits for
investment and trade than those touted when FTAs are proposed.90
Second, other social and economic costs may partially offset
benefits. For example, in countries with significant HIV/AIDS
epidemics, limiting flexibilities to address this public health issue
may have negative economic effects. 91  Finally, developing
countries must also take account of negative economic impacts
caused by trade sanctions, such as USTR 301 actions, that may
accrue if they do not agree to heightened IP protection in an FTA.
This balance is highly dependent on characteristics of a particular
country and varies a great deal across different industries.
5.1. The Unrealized Promise of Increased Foreign Direct Investment
and Technology Transfer
A common rationale used to justify strong protection of foreign
patents in developing countries is that strong patent rights will
increase FDI. 92 As proof that IP protection is a major factor in
drawing and keeping FDI, these scholars point to several visible
examples of companies withdrawing investment in developing
countries in the face of what they term weak intellectual property
protection, or companies investing only after IP laws are
strengthened. 93 However, even supporters of this theory realize
that factors other than a country's intellectual property regime also
play a role, including "government regulations, tax policies, and
land and labor costs ....
This view of the relationship between intellectual property
rights and FDI is far from universal. Many scholars argue that
aglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RL32314.pdf (stating that a U.S.-Thailand FTA can
increase U.S. investment in Thailand and help "increase the competitiveness and
market share of Thai products in the U.S. market").
90 See infra Section 5.1.
91 See infra Section 6.2.
92 See, e.g., David Hindman, The Effect of Intellectual Property Regimes on
Foreign Investments in Developing Economies, 23 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 467, 474
(2006) (stating that FDI may decrease if developing countries do not implement
strong intellectual property protection because "[f]oreign investment
entrepreneurs struggle with valuing the risk of investing in a developing country
with poor IP enforcement").
93 See id. at 473 (discussing the decision by Microsoft to move capital into
Brazil after the country enacted new laws for copyright and software protection in
1998, and similar decisions by Canon and Sony).
94 Id. at 475.
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increasing domestic protection for foreign intellectual property
does little to boost FDI in developing countries. 95 A 1993 report by
the United Nations Transnational Corporations and Management
Division 96 found little empirical evidence of a correlation between
intellectual property rights and FDI. While highly technical
industries, such as pharmaceuticals, show stronger evidence of
such a correlation,97 the United Nations study found that countries
with weak protection routinely benefited from strong levels of
FDI.98 High rates of FDI are correlated with countries the United
States Trade Representative has placed on its watch list of worst
intellectual property rights violators.99  Even a Congressional
Research Service report on the proposed U.S.-Thailand FTA notes
that FDI in Thailand fell from $3.9 billion in 2001 to an average $1.5
billion from 2002-05, partly because FDI was lost to China, a
country frequently cited as an IP rights violator. 00
It is perhaps more important that whatever FDI does result
from stricter intellectual property rights may not be as beneficial as
developed countries claim, and does not seem to spur technology
95 See, e.g., Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in
Encouraging Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer, 9 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 109, 128 (1998) ("[S]trong IPRs alone do not sufficiently generate strong
incentives for firms to invest in a country."). But see Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual
Property Protection, Foreign Direct Investment, and Technology Transfer (Int'l Fin.
Corp. Discussion Paper No. 19, 1994) (stating that strong intellectual property
rights are a significant factor in spurring FDI).
96 U.N. TRANSNAT'L CORPS. AND MGMT. DiV., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/SER.A/24, U.N. Sales No.
E.93.II.A.10 (1993) [hereinafter IP RIGHTS AND FDI].
97 Id. at 6.
98 See Frederick M. Abbott, Commentary: The International Intellectual Property
Order Enters the 21st Century, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'TL L. 471, 474 (1996)
("[C]ountries with the weakest levels of IPRs protection.., over the past decade
have routinely been the recipients of the largest net FDI inflows.").
99 Id.
100 AHEARN & MORRISON, supra note 89, at 4-5. The CRS report also points out
that the 2005 USTR "Special 301" report found that Thailand had taken a number
of steps in 2004 to increase IP protection. Id. at 8. Thus, a shift of FDI from
Thailand to China in 2003, where Thailand had strengthened IP protection and
China was cited as a frequent violator of IP rights, is contrary to the view that
strengthening IP rights attracts more FDI.
It should be noted that while data are available showing the economic impact
of trade sanctions, little attention has been given to the economic impact of USTR
"Special 301" listing for countries not subject to sanctions. While such data could
be important to a developing country's overall assessment of an FTA, analysis of
this complex factor is far beyond the scope of this Comment.
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transfer to developing countries. For example, Gtirak refers to a
class of "hidden costs" of FDI and technology transfer, including
non-competition clauses and over-pricing imports while under-
pricing exports, which diminish the real economic benefits of
FDI.1 01
In addition, the 1993 United Nations report found that
transnational companies, especially those in high-technology
fields, did not transfer research and development activities to
developing countries. 10 2  The lack of transfer of technical
knowledge diminishes the benefits of any FDI. As a result, while
patenting rates may rise in developing countries after stronger
intellectual property rights are established, foreign patentees hold
the vast majority of new patents while patent rates for national
residents remain flat.1
03
5.2. Economic and Social Costs of HIV/AIDS
Certain developing countries, particularly those in sub-Saharan
Africa and Southeast Asia with high HIV/AIDS infection rates,
must also balance the costs of an AIDS epidemic against the
benefits of an FTA with a developed country. This is an important
consideration because, as discussed in Section 3.2, many FTAs
preclude the use of intellectual property flexibilities that are crucial
policy options for combating the disease. HIV and AIDS are a
tremendous economic and social detriment.104 Increased mortality
and morbidity caused by AIDS affect households, businesses, and
the public sector.105 Prevalence of AIDS may also affect political
101 HASAN GORAK, HIDDEN COSTS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: ADVERSE IMPACTS
OF PACKAGE DEALS WITH RESTRICTIVE CLAUSES 12-16 (2001), available at
http://www.hasmendi.net/makale-gurak/YKEc ReviewHiddenCosts.pdf
(discussing costs associated with FDI in package deals).
102 IP RIGHTS AND FDI, supra note 96, at 6 ("Most R&D activity undertaken by
[transnational corporations] continues to be highly concentrated in their countries
of origin or in other industrialized countries, particularly in high-technology
fields.").
103 See Lee G. Branstetter et al., Do Stronger Intellectual Property Rights Increase
International Technology Transfer? Empirical Evidence from U.S. Firm-Level Data 20
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11516, 2005) (discussing the
impact of development on a nation's patent system).
104 See generally THE MACROECONOMICS OF HIV/AIDS 41 (Markus Haacker ed.,
2004).
105 Markus Haacker, HIV/AIDS: The Impact on the Social Fabric and the
Economy, in THE MACROECONOMICS OF HIV/AIDS, supra note 104, at 41, 64
[hereinafter Haacker, Social Fabric].
2008]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. 1. Int'l L.
decisionmaking, leading to decreased political efficiency and
potentially causing political instability.106
Economic models show that AIDS may also lower both GDP
and per capita income. These decreases are due to several factors.
First, countries with AIDS epidemics experience a decreased
savings rate because residents spend more money on medical
care.107 Second, mortality and morbidity lead to a smaller labor
supply, lowering output, and also to a less efficient workforce.108
Finally, mortality from AIDS destroys any prior investment in
human capital, such as schooling and training.109  Haacker
summarized several studies that predicted these effects in South
Africa. A 2000 study by ING Barings South African Research
estimated a 12.8% decrease in labor supply and 3.1% decline in real
GDP by 2010.110 A similar 2001 study by Arndt and Lewis
estimated an 8% decline in per capita GDP by 2010.111
One major economic impact incorporated by these GDP
estimates is the burden on a country's public health care system.
The cost of programs both to treat opportunistic diseases
associated with AIDS and to provide ARVs can be staggering. For
example, South Africa estimated that in 2007 and 2008, its
treatment program would cost 4.5 billion rand, or roughly U.S.
$620 million.112 Estimates in sub-Saharan countries for the year
2010 show AIDS treatment programs accounting for between 0.6%
of GDP in South Africa to 3.8% of GDP in Lesotho.13
Personnel costs associated with HIV/AIDS also affect GDP.
Haacker categorizes these costs as absenteeism, sick leave, medical
benefits, death-related benefits, and the cost of replacing staff
106 See id. at 65 ("One possible consequence is increased political instability,
spurred by dissatisfaction with the government in place or with the political
process in general.").
107 Id. at 67.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 76 (citing KRISTINA QUATrEK & THEA FOURIE, ING BARINGS: SOUTH
AFRICAN RESEARCH, THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF AIDS IN SOUTH AFRICA: A DARK
CLOUD ON THE HORIZON (2000)).
111 Channing Arndt & Jeffrey D. Lewis, The HIV/AIDS Pandemic in South
Africa: Sectoral Impacts and Unemployment, 13 J. INT'L DEV. 427, 439 (2001).
112 See Markus Haacker, The Impact of HIV/AIDS on Government Finance and
Public Services, in THE MACROECONOMICS OF HIV/AIDS, supra note 104, at 198, 228
(discussing South Africa's Operational Plan).
113 Id. at 229.
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members lost to HIV/AIDS.114 In a country with AIDS-related
mortality of two percent, absenteeism and sick leave alone would
cut between two and three percent of the total working time of
public sector employees.115 AIDS also has a large impact on the
private sector. Haacker points out that private firms experience
increases in the costs of employee health care, training and
recruiting, and death-related benefits.116 In a 2004 survey, 39% of
the South African companies that responded stated that HIV/AIDS
had increased absenteeism or reduced productivity of their
workforce.17
HIV/AIDS has a distinct economic impact, and many
developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa and in Southeast Asia
are struggling to fight the disease effectively. For these countries,
analysis of the benefits of an FTA with restrictive IP provisions
must account for losses in GDP, increased personnel costs, and the
burden on its healthcare system. The costs of AIDS significantly
offset the benefits of FTAs in these countries, especially in light of
the failure of many FTAs to generate the level of FDI and
technology transfer that was initially promised. 118  Empirical
evidence from past FTAs and a comparison of the proposed U.S.-
Thailand FTA to other recently completed agreements show that
when AIDS-related costs are included, the benefits of the FTA are
minimal.19
6. PHARMACEUTICALS AND PROPOSED FTAs IN THAILAND AND
THE SACU
Thailand and the SACU are particularly important case studies
in this area because both have a high rate of HIV/AIDS and also
have been negotiating TRIPS-plus FTAs with the United States.
The U.S.-Thailand and U.S.-SACU FTAs would preclude many of
the abovementioned TRIPS flexibilities that would allow those
countries to combat the disease. The following sections analyze
AIDS treatment programs and pharmaceutical sectors in Thailand
114 Id. at 203.
115 Id. at 204.
116 Haacker, Social Fabric, supra note 105, at 51-52.
117 Id. at 57.
118 See supra Section 5.1.
119 See infra Section 6.
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and the SACU countries, as well as the proposed FTAs with the
United States.
6.1. Thailand's HIV/AIDS Treatment Program
In its efforts to treat a growing AIDS problem, Thailand
initially focused exclusively on prevention of new infections, but
soon realized that treating infected people to prolong and improve
the quality of their lives was also essential. 120  The Thai
government began to offer ARV treatment and, in 2002, started a
national health insurance system covering 95% of the population
for a fee of 30 baht, or U.S. $0.79, per clinical visit. 121 In 2005, the
government announced inclusion of ARV treatment in the "30
baht" treatment system.
122
The most significant factor in the success of this program has
been the availability of inexpensive generic ARV drugs.123 Initially,
the program used branded ARV drugs that cost $10,000 per person
each year.124 Then, the Government Pharmaceutical Organization
("GPO") developed an ARV cocktail called GPO-vir, a generic
product that combined three drugs (stavudine, lamivudine, and
nevirapine).125 GPO-vir costs $31 per person per month, much
lower than the $490 per person per month cost of the branded
equivalent. 126
While GPO-vir has been successful, it is not possible for the
Thai government to continue using only that ARV cocktail. So-
called "first-line" treatments typically become less effective over
time as viruses develop resistance to the drugs.127 In addition,
120 OXFAM INT'L, supra note 20, at 9.
121 Id.
122 See id. (discussing the "30 baht" treatment program).
123 See id. at 9-10 (stating that while increased budget allocations for ARVs
helped improve public access, inexpensive generic drugs have been the most
crucial factor in the program's success).
124 Id. at 10.
125 See JAKKRIT KUANPOTH, INT'L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV.,
HARMONISATION OF TRIPS-PLus IPR POLICIES AND POTENTIAL IMPACTS ON
TECHNOLOGICAL CAPACITY: A CASE STUDY OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN
THAILAND 25 (2006), available at http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/
docs/Jakkrit-edited%20final%20draft%2001% 2ONov%2006.pdf (discussing GPO's
success in the generic pharmaceuticals market).
126 OXFAM INT'L, supra note 20, at 10.
127 Id. at 11.
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some patients have adverse reactions to nevirapine.128  The
government will need to get access to second-line and third-line
treatments in the future, but these were produced more recently
and are subject to patent in Thailand. As a result, the second-line
treatments recommended by the WHO are expensive. For
example, lopinavir syrup costs $310 per bottle, and a lopinavir-
ritonavir combination costs $467 for 180 capsules.129  By
comparison, a generic version produced in India costs just $156.130
While Thailand has not used compulsory licensing in the past,
the World Bank reports that the Thai government could use
compulsory licensing to reduce second-treatment ARV cost by
90%, which would reduce future budgetary obligations by $3.2
billion.'31 Significantly, on November 29, 2006, Thailand
announced its plans to issue a compulsory license on the ARV
drug efavirenz.132 A letter from twenty-two members of Congress
to the U.S. Trade Representative for the region indicates that the
United States is pressuring Thailand not to use the license, possibly
through threat of trade sanctions.133 In response to the threat of a
compulsory license, Merck, the owner of the patent on efavirenz,
decided to offer price cuts on the drug to Thailand. 34
However, not all efforts at compulsory licensing in recent
months have proved as effective. Thailand also stated its intention
to issue a compulsory license on lopinavir/ritonavir, another AIDS
drug marketed under the name Kaletra by Abbott Laboratories, a
128 Id.
129 Id. at 12.
130 Id.
131 ANA REVENGA ET AL., THE WORLD BANK, THE ECONOMICS OF EFFECTIVE AIDS
TREATMENT: EVALUATING POLICY OPTIONS FOR THAILAND 169 (2006), available at
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/
IB/2006/09/26/000310607_20060926124315/Rendered/PDF/374490TH0
Economics0aids01PUBLICl.pdf ("[B]y exercising compulsory licensing to reduce
the cost of second-line therapy by 90 percent, the government would reduce its
future budgetary obligations by US$3.2 billion discounted....").
132 Letter from Rep. Tom Allen et al., Members of U.S. Cong., to Ambassador
Susan C. Schwab, U.S. Trade Representative (Jan. 10, 2007), available at http://
www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/thailand/congressional-schwabletter-thailand-10
jan06.pdf [hereinafter Letter to Ambassador Schwab].
133 See id. ("We are writing to urge that the United States respect the decision
of the Thai government to issue a compulsory license on the AIDS drug
efavirenz.").
134 See Amy Kazmin & Andrew Jack, Merck to Offer AIDS Drug Price Cut to
Thais, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 1, 2006, at 10.
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U.S. company.135 In response, Abbott Laboratories decided to
withdraw applications for new drugs in Thailand, including a new
heat-stable version of Kaletra. While Abbott is under great
pressure from health advocacy groups, such as M~decins Sans
Fronti~res, 136 the company has not relented on pricing as Merck
did, and maintains that Thailand "has chosen to break patents on
numerous medicines, ignoring the patent system."137 Thailand's
Ministry of Public Health claims that providing ARVs under the
compulsory license will save 8,000 lives.138 However, it is unclear
to what extent resulting actions by pharmaceutical companies such
as Abbott Laboratories, including decreased access to future ARV
medications, will compromise the overall efficacy of the
compulsory licenses. Despite this altercation, it is still possible that
it is in Thailand's best economic and social interests to continue to
issue compulsory licenses where necessary to avert human health
crises.
6.2. The Thailand-U.S. FTA
The FTA that the United States is negotiating with Thailand
largely incorporates the strong level of intellectual property rights
and corresponding limits on the flexibilities for developing
countries discussed in Section 3.1. The FTA would require
Thailand to extend protection to previously non-patentable subject
matter, including biological processes, genes, gene sequences, and
methods of medical treatment. 39  This extension diminishes
Thailand's freedom to use products in these categories, and may
have an impact on the importation and production of
pharmaceuticals.
A second key feature of the FTA is that in some instances,
Thailand must allow "second use" patents on drugs that already
were protected by patent.140 For example, if a company finds a
135 Amy Kazmin & Andrew Jack, Thailand Confirms Switch to Generic
Medicines, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 30, 2007, at 6.
136 Abbott's Drug Policy Denounced by MSF, THE NATION (Thailand), Mar. 19,
2007.
137 Abbott Takes a Tranquilliser, Tells Thais: 'Talk to My Boss,' THE NATION
(Thailand), Mar. 25, 2007.
138 Id.
139 KUANPOTH, supra note 125, at 14.
140 Id. at 15 ("Thailand must allow claims to a new use of an old drug or
claims to a new therapeutic application of a known drug.").
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new clinical use for a drug that was already patented and new
clinical trials are needed to get marketing approval, the FTA
requires three additional years of patent protection.141
The Thailand FTA goes even farther than other FTAs to protect
test data. It protects all information relating to a drug, so unlike
other FTAs such as CAFTA, protection is not limited to
undisclosed data. 42 The FTA also requires Thailand's regulatory
body to inform a pharmaceutical patent holder whenever another
company seeks registration of a generic drug.143 The authority
would not be permitted to issue registrations for any generic
medicine unless it is sure the drug does not infringe any patents.'"
This provision essentially transforms the Thai regulatory authority
into a defender of foreign patent rights.
The Thailand FTA also significantly erodes the availability of
compulsory licenses. Thailand would be permitted to issue a
license only in certain cases, namely, limiting anticompetitive
practices, public non-commercial use, and national emergencies. 145
This protection goes beyond TRIPS, under which there are no
restrictions on the circumstances in which a compulsory license
may issue provided that the requisite conditions are met.
The United States advocates for the FTA by citing broad
economic benefits for both countries. The 2003 Congressional
Research Service report speculates that by eliminating U.S. tariff
and non-tariff barriers to Thai exports, the FTA could make Thai
products more competitive in the U.S. market. 46 This report also
141 See OXFAM INT'L, supra note 20, at 19 ("Three additional years of
monopoly protection are granted to the company of origin if it finds a new clinical
use for a drug already on the market in some form and if new clinical trials are
needed to gain marketing approval for the new use (for example, use by
children).").
142 See id. at 18-19 (detailing the stringent requirements of the Thailand FTA
with respect to test data, and noting that "even clinical trials published in US
scientific journals could not be used by the Thai regulatory authority, as it often
does now, to register a generic drug"). Preventing use of disclosed test data
strengthens protections under the Thailand FTA beyond those binding on patent
applicants in the United States, where public disclosure of a patented product and
associated data may preclude patentability after time.
143 KUANPOTH, supra note 125, at 16-17.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 15; OXFAM INT'L, supra note 20, at 19.
146 See AHEARN & MORRISON, supra note 89, at 2 ("By eliminating U.S. tariff
and non-tariff barriers to Thai exports, an FTA could help increase the
competitiveness and market share of Thai products in the U.S. market.").
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refers generally to an unspecified increase in U.S. investment in
Thailand.
47
A 2003 study of the U.S.-Thailand FTA by the Thailand
Development Research Institute ("TDRI"), using a computable
general equilibrium model, predicted that the FTA could lead to a
5.41% increase in exports from Thailand to the United States.
148
However, analysis has indicated that while exports may increase,
U.S. goods, particularly meat, dairy, and some agricultural
products, would probably still have an advantage over similar
products from Thailand. 49 The TDRI study also found that the
FTA would lead to a 1.34% increase in real GDP. 50 These numbers
do not indicate strong economic results for Thailand under the
FTA. The TDRI study stated that if the GDP growth took three
years to occur, the additional growth in the economy from the FTA
would be just over one-half percent annually, and thus would not
justify a rush to enter such an FTA. 151 This level of growth is of the
same order of magnitude as projected drops in real GDP caused by
HIV/AIDS in heavily afflicted countries. 152 The similarity between
projected gains and losses is significant because the FTA itself
curbs a nation's ability to stem HIV/AIDS losses. An FTA thus not
only provides minimal gains but also eliminates options to address
a health problem already sapping national economic development.
While the economic losses attributed to HIV/AIDS cannot be
eliminated entirely by preserving IP flexibilities, these policy
options will be a crucial element of a comprehensive policy
solution. Further, HIV/AIDS-based GDP losses may surpass
current estimates if Thailand lacks the IP flexibilities necessary to
craft an effective solution to the problem. GDP gains from an FTA
would not likely rise in proportion to these additional losses.
147 See id. ("Thailand also does not want to be excluded from FTA benefits the
U.S. has negotiated with other countries, particularly the potential of an FTA to
increase U.S. investment in Thailand.").
148 THAILAND DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, A STUDY ON THE IMPACTS OF
THAILAND-US FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 30 (2003), available at http://www.info
.tdri.or.th/reports/published/final.zip [hereinafter TDRI REPORT].
149 KUANPOTH, supra note 125, at 12.
150 TDRI REPORT, supra note 148, at 30.
151 Id. at 33 ("Even with the TDRI CGE model the real economic expansion
following the FTA is merely 1.34 percent. If the impacts take three years to fully
realize, the additional growth rate from the FTA is less than half a percentage
point annually. There seems to be no cause then for rushing the negotiation
process.").
152 See supra Section 5.2.
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6.3. SACU HIV/AIDS Treatment Programs and Pharmaceuticals
By necessity, several SACU countries have addressed the
severe AIDS infection rates with ARV programs. Botswana, a
leader in recognizing the problem posed by AIDS and in offering
treatment, began offering ARVs through a public healthcare
system in December 2001.153 The public health system was
providing 17,000 people with ARVs by October 2004,154 and over
54,000 people were getting ARVs by September 2005.155 The
Namibian government initiated an ARV program in 2003,156 and
was providing free ARVs to roughly 24,000 people by 2006.157
South Africa, the SACU country with the most people living with
HIV/AIDS, initiated an ARV program in 2003.158 By October 2006,
about 265,000 people were receiving free ARVs.159
Lesotho and Swaziland have been less successful. Lesotho has
not enacted any substantial public program providing ARVs. The
pharmaceutical company Bristol-Myers Squibb did set up an ARV
program, 160 but the WHO found that in December 2005, only 8,400
of the 58,000 people needing ARV treatment were receiving it.161 In
Swaziland, 13,006 of the 42,000 people needing ARVs receive
them. 62
153 Tenu Avafia, The Potential Impact of US-SACU FTA Negotiations on Public
Health in Southern Africa 13 (Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa, Working
Paper No. 6/2004, 2004), available at http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3
?idarticle=1357.
154 Id. It is notable that 17,000 people are enrolled in Botswana's public ARV
program, but this number is still far fewer than the 300,000 infected people in the
country. Id.
155 Botswana's ARV Programme an Example to Others, MAIL & GUARDIAN
ONLINE, Nov. 30, 2005, http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=258115.
156 Avafia, supra note 153, at 14.
157 Namibia: Reaching Targets Despite Great Obstacles, PLUSNEWS, Oct. 30, 2006,
http://www.plusnews.org/Report.aspx?Reportld=62634.
158 Avafia, supra note 153, at 14.
159 Nawaal Deane, ARV Targets Fall Short, HEALTH-E, Dec. 1, 2006,
http://www.health-e.org.za/news/article.php?uid=20031552.
160 Avafia, supra note 153, at 15.
161 WORLD HEALTH ORG., LESOTHO: SUMMARY COUNTRY PROFILE FOR
HIV/AIDS TREATMENT SCALE-UP 1 (2005), available at http://www.who.int/hiv/
HIVCPLSO.pdf.
162 WORLD HEALTH ORG., SWAZILAND: SUMMARY COUNTRY PROFILE FOR
HIV/AIDS TREATMENT SCALE-UP 1 (2005), available at http://www.who.int/hiv/
HIVCPSWZ.pdf.
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6.4. The U.S.-SACU FTA
The terms of the proposed U.S.-SACU FTA with respect to
intellectual property are very similar to those in the U.S.-Thailand
FTA. The FTA includes limitations on compulsory licenses and
access to test data that are now standard fixtures of U.S. FTAs, and
requires SACU countries to adopt U.S. standards of patentability
and patent duration. In early 2006, it became apparent that the
U.S.-SACU negotiations were unlikely to yield a completed FTA
due to the intractable stance of the United States.163 However,
SACU is still discussing a series of scaled back trade talks,164 so it
will remain important for the SACU countries to bear
pharmaceutical access in mind as they evaluate any trade
agreements.
The analysis that exists for the U.S.-SACU FTA shows fairly
modest economic gains for the SACU countries. One study
estimated that the FTA would produce a one percent rise in GDP
for the SACU countries. 165 The study also found that increases in
U.S. imports from SACU countries would be small.1 66 The study
also concluded that benefits from increased U.S. investment in
SACU countries would be small.167 The study concluded that a
unilateral or multilateral trade regime would be more
economically beneficial for SACU than the bilateral U.S.-SACU
FTA.168 Perhaps more importantly, possible GDP losses
attributable to HIV/AIDS, discussed in Section 5.2, either equal or
surpass potential gains from the U.S.-SACU FTA.
163 See "Inflexible" U.S. Threatens Southern Africa Free-Trade Deal, TRADE LAW
CENTRE FOR SouTHERN AFRICA, Mar. 31, 2006, http://www.tralac.org/
scripts/content.php?id=4703 (discussing how the inflexibility of the United States
on a variety of trade-related issues led SACU to be reluctant to complete an FTA).
164 Terence Creamer, SACU-U.S. to Pursue Scaled-Back Trade Talks After FTA
Process Ceases, POLITY (S. Afr.), Nov. 21, 2006, http://www.polity.org.za/article
.php?aid=98063.
165 Drusilla K. Brown, Kozo Kiyota & Robert M. Stern, An Analysis of the U.S.-
SACU FTA Negotiations 19 (Ford Sch. of Pub. Policy, Univ. of Mich., RSIE
Discussion Paper No. 545, 2006), available at http://www.fordschool.umich.edu/
rsie/workingpapers/Papers526-550/r545.pdf.
166 See id. at 19-20 (stating that export increases are small in percentage terms,
and that the largest gains would be in textiles and apparel, trade and transport
services, and other private and government-related services).
167 Id. at 21.
168 Id. at 22.
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7. COMPARISONS TO EXISTING U.S. FTAs
The United States completed a TRIPS-plus FTA with Jordan in
2001 and another with Australia in 2004. Because these FTAs have
been in force for several years, more rigorous economic predictions
and even some empirical data exist showing the costs and benefits
of the FTAs. These data include the effect of the FTAs on drug
pricing, on the time it takes for generics to come to market, and on
domestic pharmaceutical production. Comparisons of the
pharmaceutical sectors in Jordan and Australia to those in
Thailand and the SACU countries, as well as economic analysis of
the U.S.-Jordan and U.S-Australia FTAs, help give a performance
baseline of the likely economic impacts and drug access that can be
expected for Thailand and the SACU countries under the proposed
U.S. FTAs.
7.1. Australia
7.1.1. The Australian Pharmaceutical Sector and the
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme
While Australia's pharmaceutical sector is not nearly as
developed as that of the United States, it far exceeds
pharmaceutical sectors in most developing countries. Australia
has over 120 pharmaceutical companies located in the country,
including both domestic and foreign-owned companies. 169 These
firms all perform research and development ("R&D") and the
workforce is described as "highly skilled and productive." 170
Globally the Australian sector is relatively small, comprising only
one percent of total global pharmaceutical sales,171 yet is growing
fairly rapidly. Despite this, Australia still imports far more than it
exports -in 2002 Australia imported pharmaceuticals totaling U.S.
$3 billion while it exported only $1.2 billion.172 R&D spending
increased from $26.6 million in 1987-1988 to $196 million in 1999-
169 MONIQUE Roos, PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: AUSTRALIA (2003), http://
strategis.gc.ca/epic/ site/ imr-ri.nsf/fr/ grl14412f.html.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id. (stating that Australia's pharmaceutical imports of U.S. $3 billion came
primarily from the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and
Switzerland).
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2000,173 and Australia's share of exports (as a percentage of OECD-
15 total pharmaceutical exports) has risen from 0.6% in 1980 to
1.7% in 2000.174
Like Thailand and the SACU countries, Australia has used a
governmental body to address drug-pricing issues. The
Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee ("PBAC")
investigates whether a new drug is cost-effective at the price the
producing company charges.1 75 After investigation by the PBAC,
the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme ("PBS") does not seek the
lowest possible price, but rather it pays what it believes is a fair
price for the drug. 176 Because the PBS does not seek to minimize
costs, it has been criticized for not taking maximum advantage of
the availability of generic products.177 However, the results show
that the PBS has been effective. In 2003 the Australia Institute
estimated that for high-cost drugs, the PBS showed savings of
roughly 35% by the fourth year after competing generic drugs
were introduced. 178 The PBS is widely regarded as being one of the
most successful governmental pharmaceutical distribution and
price-reduction systems in the world. 17
9
Both the features of the Australian pharmaceutical industry
described above and the success of the PBS demonstrate several
key points about the sector. First, Australia has an established
173 Id. (indicating that increased R&D spending has been a key factor leading
to growth of the Australian pharmaceutical industry).
174 George Messinis, The Australian Pharmaceutical Industry and its Global
Context 26 fig.21 (Pharmaceutical Indus. Project: Equity, Sustainability and Indus.
Dev., Working Paper No. 7, 2002), available at http://cfses.com/documents/
pharma/07-AustPharmaInd.PDF.
175 See Peter Drahos et al., Pharmaceuticals, Intellectual Property and Free Trade:
The Case of the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement, 22 PROMETHEUS 243, 244 (2004)
[hereinafter Pharmaceuticals, Intellectual Property and Free Trade] ("The PBAC
judges whether a new drug is cost-effective... by comparing it (reference pricing)
with an existing therapy (usually another drug). If the PBS is to pay a higher price
for the new drug than for the old, Section 101 of the National Health Act requires
that the committee be convinced that the new one is more effective, safer, or
both.").
176 See id. at 246 ("In order to obtain [a fair] price the PBS through its
committees of experts aggregates information about a drug and then develops a
sophisticated evaluation of a drug's clinical worth.").
177 See id. at 251 (stating that the PBS system needs reform because it does not
take maximum advantage of generic drug competition).
178 Id.
179 See id. at 243 (stating that Australia's PBS is "regarded by many as
representing the world's best practice").
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pharmaceutical industry comprising both foreign and domestic
firms, all of which conduct R&D activities in the country. Second,
while Australia is a net pharmaceutical importer, it does export
pharmaceutical products, and its capacity in this area is growing.
Finally, Australia has a generic drug industry with sufficient
capacity to facilitate the PBS. These features distinguish it greatly
from most developing countries.
7.1.2. The Australia-U.S. FTA
It is logical to think that because Australia had the fifteenth
largest economy in the world at the time the Australia-U.S. FTA
("AUSFTA) 180 was completed, 181 the United States would have
offered Australia more favorable terms in its FTA than those the
United States has offered to developing countries. However, the
AUSFTA embodies most of the same key features as the proposed
Thailand agreement. For example, compulsory licenses are limited
to the same three circumstances -to remedy anticompetitive
practices, in cases of public non-commercial use, and in
circumstances of national emergency. 82 The FTA eliminates the
experimental use exception, allowing only the early working
exception to apply to production of competing pharmaceutical
products. 183 Like the Thai FTA, the AUSFTA blocks registration of
generics for at least five years. 8 4
Based on its limitations of generic drugs, the Australia Institute
estimated that the AUSFTA would delay release of generics by an
average of twenty-four months.185 The study analyzed five brand-
name drugs that would soon have generic competition, and
180 U.S.-Austl. Free Trade Agreement, May 18, 2004, 118 Stat. 919 [hereinafter
AUSFTA].
181 Drahos et al., Pharmaceuticals, Intellectual Property and Free Trade, supra note
175, at 243.
182 AUSFTA, supra note 180, art. 17.9(7).
183 Id. art. 17.9(6).
184 Id. art. 17.10(1)(a).
185 See BUDDHIMA LOKUGE, THOMAS ALURED FAUNCE & RICHARD DENNISS, THE
AUSTRALIA INSTITUTE, A BACKDOOR TO HIGHER MEDICINE PRICES? INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE AUSTRALIA-US FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 14 (2003), available at
http://cgkd.anu.edu.au/menus/PDFs/Patents%20and%2OFTA%20final.pdf
(giving the "central case," which the Institute felt was likely to be a conservative
estimate of the negative impact of the FTA).
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calculated that the delay in release of the generics would result in
$1.12 billion in lost savings to PBS from 2006 to 2009.186
One method of estimating the implications of an FTA on drug
prices is to compare the prices in the nations subject to the trade
agreement. For example, leading up to the AUSFTA, a variety of
studies related Australian drug prices to comparable ones in the
United States. One compared PBAC costs in Australia to the costs
under the U.S. Federal Supply Schedule ("FSS"), which lists prices
paid for pharmaceuticals by a variety of U.S. federal agencies.18
7
This study found that drug purchases by institutional buyers in the
United States, as listed by FSS, cost roughly 1.84 to 2.49 times more
than Australia's PBAC prices.1
88
7.2. Jordan's Pharmaceutical Sector and the U.S.-Jordan FTA
Jordan, which signed a TRIPS-plus FTA with the United States
in 2001, provides another point of comparison. The
pharmaceutical industry in Jordan is growing, showing an increase
from $77 million in total domestic production in 1990 to over $250
million in 2000.189 Despite this, Jordan's production still lags
behind more developed countries, such as Australia. In 2003,
Jordan's pharmaceutical exports were over $203 million,190 around
one sixth of Australia's 2002 exports. In addition, the Jordanian
sector is characterized by "limited capital resources and weak R&D
186 Id. The Centre for International Economics also released a study of the
proposed impacts of the AUSFTA, but reached different conclusions. See CTR. FOR
INT'L ECON., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AUSFTA 60 (2004), available at http://
www.thecie.com.au/content/publications/CIE-economicanalysis-ausfta.pdf
("The pharmaceutical measures outlined in AUSFTA are likely to have a minimal
impact on the PBS."). This study dismissed past estimates of costs under the PBS
associated with the FTA, but gave no compelling reasons for doing so, other than
to say that the studies were completed before adoption of the FTA's final terms.
Id. The study concluded, again with little to no justification, that the AUSFTA
would have "no significant net effect on the PBS" and did not include the PBS in
its economic model of the FTA's overall effects. Id.
187 See Drahos et al., Pharmaceuticals, Intellectual Property and Free Trade, supra
note 175, at 252 ("The [U.S. Federal Supply Schedule] lists the prices paid for
pharmaceuticals purchased by the US Department of Veterans Affairs and other
Federal agencies-large institutional buyers with bulk purchasing powers
comparable to the PBS.").
188 Id.
189 El-Said & El-Said, supra note 83, at 70.
190 Id.
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capacity," 191 leading to a limited ability to innovate and create new
pharmaceutical products.
The Jordanian FTA with the United States embodies the
common features of IP protection included in the other FTAs
discussed in this Comment. This includes tying approval for
Jordanian pharmaceutical exports to compliance with U.S.
regulatory requirements and expanding protection for new uses of
previously patented drugs.192 In 1995, the Jordanian Industrial
Development Bank ("IDB") published a study that found
strengthening IP rights would harm local production, in terms of
both investment and output; decrease local production, and thus
employment levels; increase drug imports and decrease exports;
and increase pharmaceutical prices.193 Despite U.S. predictions of
trade expansion, the results of the FTA for Jordan's pharmaceutical
sector have so far been much closer to the results anticipated by the
1995 IDB study.
In 2003, two years after the U.S.-Jordan FTA was signed, a
Jordanian pharmaceutical producer described the country's
development strategy as "branded-generic," which he explained
means that producers "'search for the formula on the internet...
and then we produce it. Some copy the formula literally but most
modify it a little bit then produce it under a different name. ... ,,,194
Producers pursue this strategy as long as the drugs are no longer
protected by patent, indicating the complete absence of R&D and
innovation potential. Producers essentially produce only drugs
that have come off patent after their twenty-year term of protection
expires, severely limiting access to new drugs.
Contrary to the promises often made during FTA negotiations
that foreign nations will invest directly in building capacity in-
country, not one multinational pharmaceutical company has
sought to establish facilities in Jordan, preferring to export
pharmaceutical products or license production.1 95 This is in spite
of the fact that foreign investment in Jordan in general has been
191 Id. at 72.
192 Id. at 69.
193 See id. at 72 (citing INDUS. DEV. BANK, STUDY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN JORDAN (1995)).
194 Id. at 72-73. (quoting a June 2003 interview with Amman, a local
pharmaceutical provider).
195 See id. at 73 ("So far, not even a single multinational pharmaceutical firm
has opted to serve the Jordanian market by establishing fully owned production
facilities there.").
7972008]
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rising since 1997 due to privatization, long before Jordan adopted
stronger IP rights.196 As a result, drug imports have been rising
steadily, from $58 million in 1990 to more than $203 million in
2003,197 and evidence suggests that prices have also increased.
198
Finally, the share of local firms in the industry decreased to 35% in
2000, down from a previous high of 45%.199 These data show that
the FTA Jordan signed does not correlate to a better ratio of
pharmaceutical exports to imports, to a more developed domestic
pharmaceutical research capacity, or to a greater percentage of
local firms in the domestic industry.
7.3. Implications for the U.S.-Thailand and U.S.-SACU FTAs
The preceding analysis of the AUSFTA and U.S.-Jordan FTA
demonstrates that even in developed countries, TRIPS-plus treaties
can have a significant negative impact on pharmaceutical prices,
and that the effects are even more pronounced in countries with
less developed pharmaceutical sectors. While studies predict that
Australia will experience slower time-to-market and increased
prices for generic drugs as a result of the AUSFTA, the industry is
growing nonetheless, and has increased its percentage of exports.
This is in stark contrast to the results for Jordan, which now has a
pharmaceutical sector that has little R&D capacity and essentially
produces only medicines that have come off patent. This
divergence of outcomes for Australia and Jordan illustrates the
importance of several key factors in predicting the impact of
restrictive IP rights on a country's pharmaceutical sector. These
factors include:
(1) the strength of domestic producers relative to foreign
producers in a country's pharmaceutical industry;
(2) the country's level of R&D capacity;
(3) a country's ability to produce generic drugs; and
(4) a country's strength as a pharmaceutical exporter.
196 Id. at 71.
197 Id. at 73.
198 See id. ("Anecdotal evidence also suggests that the price of medicine in
Jordan, which is largely demand inelastic, has risen sharply in recent years,
particularly the prices of imported drugs and that which is produced locally but
under international licensing agreements.").
199 Id.
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The stronger a country is in the areas mentioned above, the
more able it will be to take advantage of strong IP protection in
fostering its own domestic industry and production capacity.
Countries that are weak in these areas will not be able to profit
from strong IP rights, and will likely lose out to foreign countries
that are more successful in R&D and exportation. These foreign
nations will use the newly enhanced IP regimes as a tool to
increase exports, but may have little incentive to transfer
technology to the FTA host country. The likely end result for the
developing countries is a diminished ability to use IP flexibilities to
control drug prices or provide broad access, but no corresponding
growth of their own pharmaceutical industry. Analysis in terms of
these factors, and comparison to both Australia and Jordan, reveal
that Thailand and the SACU countries lack the strength in R&D,
domestic production, and drug exportation to benefit from IP-
restrictive FTAs.
In 2005, Thailand had 162 firms that manufactured modern
pharmaceutical products, 200 but no firms in Thailand, either foreign
or local, performed research and development seeking to develop
new drugs.2 1 Due to the lack of domestic R&D and production,
Thailand also imports roughly 95% of the chemical compounds
needed for drug production, adding to the nation's dependence on
foreign countries for access to medicine. 20 2  As discussed
previously, generic drugs have been crucial to AIDS treatment
efforts in Thailand. While branded drugs produced by
multinational companies still enjoy a healthy market share (35%),
Thailand depends heavily on generic drugs. 203 A system of IP
rights that decreases Thailand's ability to produce or import
generics will severely hamper its access to medicines, and thus its
programs to fight AIDS. The World Bank reached the same
conclusion, noting that while Thailand may be tempted to enter
into a bilateral FTA with the United States that included limitations
on compulsory licensing, doing so would be very detrimental to
Thailand's ability to treat AIDS.
2° 4
200 KUANPOTH, supra note 125, at 24.
201 Id. at 25.
202 Id. at 26.
203 See id. at 35-36 (concluding that the characteristics of the Thai
pharmaceutical market, coupled with branded drug company marketing
strategies, cause unnecessarily high consumption of non-essential drugs, strong
reliance on branded drugs, and high drug prices).
204 REVENGA ET AL., supra note 131, at 169 ("Because Thailand stands to gain a
20081 799
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The research pharmaceutical industry is somewhat more
developed in southern Africa than in Thailand, but key limitations
exist compared to Australia. For example, of the five SACU
nations only South Africa has a well-established generic
pharmaceutical manufacturing industry, and no other country in
the region has the expertise to establish such a multi-firm
industry.2 5 Thus, South Africa is a potential pharmaceutical
exporter, but the other SACU countries have very limited capacity
to produce their own ARVs at affordable prices. Unlike Thailand,
several key research pharmaceutical companies have facilities in
southern Africa,206 although it is unclear whether the presence of
offices in the region translates to greater in-country knowledge that
can be used to produce cost-effective AIDS drugs. Without the
ability under the FTA to require local production, it is unlikely that
any increased foreign investment in the region that results from an
FTA would lead to technology transfer or enable development of a
generics industry.
Analysis of the key factors discussed above shows that
Australia is more developed, both overall and specifically in the
pharmaceutical field, than either Thailand or the SACU countries.
It has greater national R&D capacity and the ability to produce
new drugs, as well as the ability to produce inexpensive generic
drugs quickly. It also has been gaining strength as an exporter,
and at least some of the pharmaceutical companies in the country
are domestic. Thailand and the SACU countries, both of which
lack a true research pharmaceutical industry, are thus much more
similar to Jordan than they are to Australia. Both have more
limited ability than Australia to develop new drugs and generics
quickly, if at all. As such, the delays in rollout and increased cost
of generic drugs that experts have predicted for Australia (delay of
generics by twenty-four months and lost savings of $1.1 billion
great deal from bilateral agreements to reduce trade barriers with trading partners
such as the United States, the Royal Thai government may be tempted to
relinquish its rights to grant compulsory licenses for AIDS drugs in exchange for
proffered trade advantages. The report finds that the cost of such concessions
would be large.").
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over four years) are likely to be more pronounced in Thailand and
the SACU countries as a result of an FTA. These countries are also
likely to experience the increased imports and erosion of existing
domestic industry that Jordan saw following completion of its
FTA. Contrary to claims by developed countries, similarities of the
industry structure in these countries to that in Jordan indicate that
even if FTAs do lead to higher FDI, this will not build domestic
capacity to provide greater access to cheaper AIDS drugs.
Due to their inability to mitigate the risks of a TRIPS-plus FTA
through the existence of a robust domestic pharmaceutical
industry, Thailand and the SACU countries will likely be worse off
than Australia and Jordan if they sign the proposed FTAs. These
nations simply lack the capacity to turn restrictive IP regimes to
their advantage, and would lose out to foreign nations who have
greater strength to make use of the TRIPS-plus framework. The
end result will be diminished success of AIDS treatment programs,
which all rely heavily on provision of generic ARV drugs. Given
the severe economic and social costs of AIDS in these countries,
discussed in Section 5.2, the harm from an FTA is likely to extend
not only to the pharmaceutical sector, but also to the national
economy as a whole.
8. CONCLUSION
Developing countries face great pressure to sign FTAs, often
under threat of trade sanctions, but many factors indicate that they
should not enter into these agreements. The benefits are more
modest than developed countries predict, and developing
countries constrain their policy options greatly by signing these
FTAs, especially in the pharmaceutical field. In countries with a
significant HIV/AIDS problem, the economics are even less
favorable due to the costs of the disease and the diminished
options for treatment that the FTAs cause. In the case of Thailand
and the SACU countries, a comparison of the costs of AIDS to the
anticipated benefits of the FTA indicates that the economic and
social costs outweigh the benefits, and these countries have done
well to move away from FTAs with the United States.
In the future, developing countries, especially those battling
HIV/AIDS epidemics, must keep their options open to enable
access to essential medicines. The flexibilities in the TRIPS
agreement, such as compulsory licenses, parallel imports, and the
ability to set standards for patentability and patent terms, are key
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tools in fighting HIV/AIDS. Developing countries must preserve
their ability to use these tools. While trade expansion is an
important economic goal, developing countries should not sign a
TRIPS-plus FTA until they either achieve a degree of success in
their fight against AIDS, or develop a significant domestic, R&D-
based pharmaceutical sector that actually can benefit from stronger
intellectual property rights.
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